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IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE 
Amici curiae, whose names and institutional affiliations are 
listed in the Appendix, are all professors who teach and write 
about copyright law or about intellectual property law in 
general.*  Amici are unbiased observers who do not have any 
financial interest in the outcome of this litigation.  The only 
interest that amici have in this litigation is a respect for the 
historical development of copyright law, and a commitment to the 
orderly development of copyright law in the future.  Amici are 
also concerned that recognizing a public performance right for 
sound recordings under California law, for the first time, would 
improperly extend California law outside the borders of the state, 
since broadcast signals cannot be confined to the borders of a 
single state.  Amici do not necessarily agree on the merits of a 
public performance right for sound recordings, but amici agree 
that 1) historically there has not been any public performance 
right in sound recordings under California law, and 2) the issue 
should be addressed on a nationwide basis, by Congress, 
prospectively, rather than on a piecemeal basis through state-by-
state litigation. 
                                      
* All signatories speak only on behalf of themselves.  Institutional 
affiliations are listed for identification purposes only. 
9 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff Flo & Eddie, Inc., contends that the phrase 
“exclusive ownership” in California Civil Code section 980 
includes all possible uses to which a copyrightable work may be 
put, including an exclusive right of public performance.  At the 
time California Civil Code section 980 was first enacted in 1872, 
however, the phrase “exclusive ownership” in relation to a 
copyrightable work meant something different and much 
narrower:  namely, the right of first publication (reproduction 
and sale) only.  Since the phrase “exclusive ownership” was 
retained without change in the subsequent 1947 and 1982 
amendments to Civil Code section 980, the phrase should be 
interpreted today in accordance with its original, common-law 
meaning.  Moreover, for the past 75 years it has been considered 
settled law that there were no public performance rights in sound 
recordings under state law.  If this Court were to interpret 
California Civil Code section 980 to grant such rights, for the first 
time, such a ruling would apply not only to Internet broadcasters, 
but also to every radio and television network and broadcast 
station whose signal reaches viewers and listeners located in 
California.  Because broadcast signals cannot be confined to the 
borders of a single state, such a ruling would improperly burden 
communication to out-of-state listeners as well, in violation of the 
dormant commerce clause. 
 
10 
ARGUMENT 
I. WHEN THE DISPUTED STATUTORY PHRASE 
“EXCLUSIVE OWNERSHIP” WAS FIRST ENACTED 
IN 1872, COMMON-LAW COPYRIGHT 
ENCOMPASSED ONLY THE RIGHT OF FIRST 
PUBLICATION (REPRODUCTION AND SALE), AND 
DID NOT INCLUDE A RIGHT OF PUBLIC 
PERFORMANCE. 
As originally enacted in 1872, Civil Code section 980 read 
as follows: 
The author of any product of the mind . . . has an 
exclusive ownership therein, and in the 
representation or expression thereof, which continues 
so long as the product and the representations or 
expressions thereof made by him remain in his 
possession. 
Section 980 has been amended three times since 1872 (in 
1947, 1949, and 1982).  Each time the statute was amended, the 
language that the trial court construed, “exclusive ownership,” 
was retained without change.  Under basic principles of statutory 
interpretation, if the Legislature retains the language of a statute 
without change, the Court should presume that the Legislature 
intended the meaning of that language to remain the same.1  
                                      
1 1A Singer and Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction (7th 
ed. 2007) § 22:33; Brailsford v. Blue (1962) 57 Cal.2d 335, 339 
(“Parts of an amended statute not affected by the amendment 
will be given the same construction that they received before the 
amendment.”); Barber v. Palo Verde Mutual Water Co. (1926) 198 
Cal. 649, 651-52 (“a clause in a statute will be given no different 
meaning after an amendment than it had before, if the 
amendment relates to other matters”); see also Bakersfield 
Energy Partners, L.P. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue (9th Cir. 
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Therefore, in order to understand what the phrase “exclusive 
ownership” means today, the Court should consider what that 
language meant to the Legislature when it was enacted in 1872. 
In 1872, copyright protection in the United States was 
shared between state law and federal law.  Before a work was 
published, it was protected by state law (so-called “common-law 
copyright”), which provided the author an exclusive right of first 
publication (reproduction and sale).2  Once a work was published, 
state-law protection was divested,3 and one of two things 
                                                                                                       
2009) 568 F.3d 767, 775 (“As a general rule, we construe words in 
a new statute that are identical to words in a prior statute as 
having the same meaning.”).  
2 See, e.g., Wheaton v. Peters (1834) 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 595 
(“That an author, at common law, has a property in his 
manuscript, and may obtain redress against any one who 
deprives him of it, or by improperly obtaining a copy endeavours 
to realise a profit by its publication, cannot be doubted; but this is 
a very different right from that which asserts a perpetual and 
exclusive property in the future publication of the work, after the 
author shall have published it”); Palmer v. De Witt (1872) 47 N.Y. 
532, 536 (“The author of a literary work or composition has, by 
[common] law, a right to the first publication of it.  He has a right 
to determine whether it shall be published at all, and if 
published, when, where, by whom, and in what form. This 
exclusive right is confined to the first publication.”). 
3 Wheaton v. Peters, supra, 33 U.S. at page 657 (distinguishing 
the common-law right before publication from a right “after the 
author shall have published it”); id. at pages 657-62 (rejecting 
four arguments in favor of a common-law right after publication); 
Palmer v. De Witt, supra, 47 N.Y. at page 537 (“This common-law 
right ‘of first publication’ is sometimes spoken of as ‘copyright 
before publication’”); id. at page 539 (“When once published, with 
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happened.  If the work was published with proper copyright 
notice, and other statutory formalities such as registration were 
satisfied, the work obtained a federal statutory copyright of 
limited duration.4  If the work was published without proper 
notice or without complying with statutory formalities, the work 
entered the public domain.5 
                                                                                                       
the assent of the author, it becomes the property of the world, 
subject only to such rights as the author may have secured under 
[statutory] copyright laws”); Banker v. Caldwell (1859) 3 Minn. 
94, 104 (“it is clear that in the United States an author has no 
exclusive property in a published work except under some act of 
congress.”). 
4 Wheaton v. Peters, supra, 33 U.S. at pages 663-64 (“when the 
legislature are about to vest an exclusive right in an author or an 
inventor, they have the power to prescribe the conditions on 
which such right shall be enjoyed; and that no one can avail 
himself of such right who does not substantially comply with the 
requisitions of the law.”). 
5 Palmer v. De Witt, supra, 47 N.Y. at page 536 (“When once 
published it is dedicated to the public, and the author has not, at 
common-law, any exclusive right to multiply copies of it or to 
control the subsequent issues of copies by others.”); Banker v. 
Caldwell, supra, 3 Minn. at page 104 (“It is the publication [of a 
manuscript] which is regarded as an abandonment of the 
exclusive property in the contents.  It is a voluntary presentation 
of it to the public, and any one may use it to such purpose as he 
may see fit.”); Bartlett v. Crittenden (C.C.D. Ohio 1849) 2 F.Cas. 
967, 968-69 (No. 1,076) (“the author who publishes his work, 
dedicates it to the public.”); Oertel v. Jacoby (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1872) 
44 How. Pr. 179, 187-88 (“[T]here has been a publication by the 
plaintiffs of the pictures mentioned in the injunction. . . .  [The 
defendants] have the right to reproduce the pictures that have 
been voluntarily given to the public.”); see also id. at pages 181-82 
(argument of Roger A. Pryor, for defendants); 2 Kent, 
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David Dudley Field, who drafted the proposed New York 
Civil Code on which the California Civil Code was based,6 was 
familiar with these principles and incorporated them into the 
Civil Code.  Section 980 provided that an author had “exclusive 
ownership” of a work, “so long as [it] remain[ed] in his 
possession.”  However, section 983 provided that: 
If the owner of a product of the mind intentionally 
makes it public, a copy or reproduction may be made 
public by any person, without responsibility to the 
owner, so far as the law of this State is concerned. 
                                                                                                       
Commentaries on American Law (1827), page 299 (when writings 
are “published with the author’s consent, they become common 
property, and subject to the free use of the community.”); 2 Kent, 
Commentaries on American Law (Holmes ed. 1873), page *365 
(same). 
The same relationship between state common-law copyright and 
federal statutory copyright was carried forward in the 1909 
Copyright Act, which remained in effect until January 1, 1978.  
See, e.g., Caliga v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co. (1909) 215 U.S. 
182, 188; National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett 
Publications, Inc. (2d Cir. 1951) 191 F.2d 594, 598; Fleischer 
Studios, Inc. v. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc. (2d Cir. 1934) 73 F.2d 
276, 277. 
6 Sections 980 and 983 of the California Civil Code, as originally 
enacted in 1872, are identical to sections 429 and 432 of the 
proposed Civil Code of the State of New York, which was drafted 
by Field.  See 1 Civil Code of the State of New York (Proposed 
Draft 1865), pages 130-31; Lee, The Civil Law and Field’s Civil 
Code in Common-Law California: A Note on What Might Have 
Been (1992) 5 West. Leg. Hist. 13, 26 (“Field’s 1865 draft of a 
proposed civil code for the State of New York became 
substantially the civil codes of the adopting states.”). 
14 
In other words, if the copyright owner published the work 
(or otherwise “intentionally ma[de] it public”), state-law copyright 
protection was divested.7 
What was the “exclusive ownership” that a work enjoyed 
under state law prior to first publication?  At the time Field 
drafted his proposed Civil Code, between 1857 and 1865,8 a 
copyright owner under federal law enjoyed only “the sole right 
and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, and vending” the 
work.  Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436.9  Similarly, 
the common-law protection afforded under state law consisted 
only of a right of first publication (reproduction and sale) of the 
work.10  This is confirmed by Civil Code section 983, which 
                                      
7 Why did Field use the phrase “intentionally made it public” 
rather than “intentionally published it”?  At the time, there was a 
debate as to whether the public performance of a play had the 
same effect as a “publication” in divesting the common-law 
copyright in the work.  Field may have intended to side with 
those authorities that held that public performance was sufficient 
to divest the common-law copyright in a work. 
8 Lee, supra, at page 25. 
9 In the Copyright Act of 1870, Congress added the verbs 
“completing, copying, executing, [and] finishing” to the list, as 
well as “the right to dramatize or translate their own works.”  
Copyright Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 212.   
10 Curtis, A Treatise on the Law of Copyright (1847), page 11 
(“The right to multiply copies of what is written or printed, and to 
take therefor whatever other possession mankind are willing to 
give in exchange, constitutes the whole claim of literary 
property.”); Woolsey v. Judd (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1855) 11 How. Pr. 49, 
55 (common-law copyright is the right to decide “whether the 
manuscript shall be published at all; and in all cases to forbid its 
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allowed anyone to make and distribute “a copy or reproduction” 
after the work was first “intentionally mad[e] public” by the 
owner. 
In England, common-law copyright did not include any 
right of public performance.11  An English statute enacted in 1833 
gave the author of a dramatic work a statutory right of public 
performance.  3 Will. 4 c. 15, § 1 (Eng.).  In 1856, Congress 
likewise enacted a public performance right for dramatic works 
only (Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138), which was 
carried forward in the Copyright Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 
Stat. 212.  Before 1856, there were no public performance rights 
of any kind in the United States, for any types of works.  As Prof. 
Jessica Litman has demonstrated, it was only after 1856 that 
                                                                                                       
publication by another.”); see also Palmer v. DeWitt, supra, 47 
N.Y. at page 536 (“The author of a literary work or composition 
has, by [common] law, a right to the first publication of it.  He 
has a right to determine whether it shall be published at all, and 
if published, when, where, by whom, and in what form. This 
exclusive right is confined to first publication.”); Parton v. Prang 
(C.C.D. Mass. 1872) 18 F.Cas. 1273, 1277 (describing “the 
exclusive right of property” in an unpublished work as the right 
to “forbid its publication by another before it has been published 
by him or by his consent or allowance,” and “to prevent another 
from multiplying copies of it or reproducing” it). 
11 Murray v. Elliston (Eng. 1822) 106 Eng.Rep. 1331 [5 Barn. & 
Ald. 657]; Coleman v. Wathen (Eng. 1793) 101 Eng.Rep. 137 [5 
T.R. 245]; see also Curtis, supra, page 104; Palmer v. De Witt, 
supra, 47 N.Y. at page 542 (“Until the passage in England of the 
statutes 3 and 4 William IV (chap. 15), an author could not 
prevent any one from publicly performing on the stage any drama 
in which the author possessed the copyright.”). 
16 
authors who failed to qualify for the federal statutory copyright 
began to claim that there was a common-law right of public 
performance for unpublished works.  Litman, The Invention of 
Common Law Play Right (2010) 25 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1381, 
1403-09.  The handful of cases decided before 1872, however, 
carefully distinguished the established right to make and sell 
copies (common-law copyright) from the newly-asserted right of 
public performance, and most rejected the notion that there was 
a common-law right of public performance. 
A leading case was Keene v. Kimball (1860) 82 Mass. (16 
Gray) 545, in which the actress Laura Keene claimed to be the 
assignee of the common-law copyright in the unpublished play 
Our American Cousin, which had been publicly performed 
frequently.  She sought an injunction to prevent the defendant 
from performing the play at a competing venue.  The court 
rejected the injunction, holding that the defendants could 
publicly perform the play so long as they did so from memory, 
without having made any copies of it: 
It should perhaps be added, to avoid misconstruction, 
that we do not intend in this decision to intimate that 
there is any right to report, phonographically or 
otherwise, a lecture or other written discourse, which 
its author delivers before a public audience, . . . and 
to publish it without his consent, or to make any use 
of a copy thus obtained.  The student who attends a 
medical lecture may have a perfect right to remember 
as much as he can, and afterward to use the 
information thus acquired in his own medical 
practice, or to communicate it to students or classes 
of his own, without involving the right to commit the 
lecture to writing, for the purpose of subsequent 
publication in print, or by oral delivery.  So any one of 
17 
the audience at a concert or opera may play a tune 
which his ear has enabled him to catch, or sing a song 
which he may carry away in his memory, for his own 
entertainment or that of others, for compensation or 
gratuitously, while he would have no right to copy or 
publish the musical composition. 
Id. at pages 551-52.12  In so holding, the court relied on, but 
distinguished, Keene v. Wheatley (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1861) 14 F.Cas. 
180 (No. 7,644), in which the court specifically found that the 
defendants had not performed the play from memory, but from a 
copy surreptitiously obtained by breach of confidence.  Id. at page 
207.  Nonetheless, the court indicated that if the facts were 
otherwise, the defendants could publicly perform the play 
without restriction: 
In the absence of any legislation for the special 
protection of dramatic literary property, an 
authorized public circulation of a printed copy of a 
drama for which there is a legislative copyright is a 
publication which legalizes an optional subsequent 
theatrical representation by anybody from such 
copy. . . . 
If the previous performance of it [the play] at her 
theatre had been the means of enabling the 
defendants fairly to bring it out at their theatre, the 
suit could not have been maintained. 
Id. at pages 185, 187.13 
                                      
12 Although Keene v. Kimball is dated “November Term 1860,” it 
must have been decided some months later, since it relies on 
Keene v. Wheatley, which was not decided until early in 1861. 
13 See also Crowe v. Aiken (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1870) 6 F.Cas. 904, 907 
(No. 3,441) (“the mere representation of a play does not of itself 
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In two other cases, the plaintiff was allowed to 
recover under the federal statutory right of public 
performance, where the playwright had registered 
the copyright in the manuscript, but had not yet 
published the work and deposited the published 
copies.14 
Thus, when Field published his proposed Civil Code in 
1865, and when California adopted its Civil Code in 1872, the 
phrase “exclusive ownership” referred to common-law copyright 
in an unpublished work, which was limited to the right to 
reproduce and sell copies of the work; and public performance 
could not be restrained except under the federal copyright 
statute, or when copies had been made or obtained in violation of 
the common law.15  The phrase “exclusive ownership” in Civil 
                                                                                                       
dedicate it to the public, except, possibly, so far as those who 
witness its performance can recollect it.”).  Crowe suggested in 
dicta that there probably was a common-law right of public 
performance, but ultimately rested its holding on the fact that 
the defendant had obtained his copy “through a short-hand 
reporter, or in some other unauthorized or wrongful way, and not 
by memory only.”  Ibid. 
14 Roberts v. Myers (C.C.D. Mass. 1860) 20 F.Cas. 898, 898 (No. 
11,906) (“The complainant claims as assignee of Boucicault, the 
author, who took out a copyright on the 12th of December, 
1859.”); Boucicault v. Fox, (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) 3 F.Cas. 977, 977 
(No. 1,691) (“On the 12th of December, the plaintiff took out a 
copyright for the play.”); id. at page 981 (“the statute upon which 
the plaintiff rests for protection, and upon which his suit is 
founded . . . is the act of August 18th, 1856 (11 Stat. 138).”). 
15 Treatise writer Ethan Drone was the first to posit (in 1879) 
that there was a full-blown common-law right of public 
performance.  Litman, supra, at pages 1410-17.  “Drone, did not, 
however, rely on judicial reasoning to tell him what the law was.  
 
19 
Code section 980 has been carried forward without change to this 
day.  The Plaintiff’s suggestion that the Legislature changed the 
meaning of the words “exclusive ownership” by amendment, 
without changing the words themselves, is implausible and 
should be rejected. 
II. FOR 75 YEARS, IT HAS BEEN CONSIDERED 
SETTLED LAW THAT THERE IS NO PUBLIC 
PERFORMANCE RIGHT FOR SOUND 
RECORDINGS. 
Since the dawn of radio broadcasting, performers and 
record companies have sought to establish a right to exclude 
others from publicly performing their sound recordings.  See 
generally Parks, Music and Copyright in America:  Toward the 
Celestial Jukebox (2012), pages 101-37.  Early answers were 
split, with Pennsylvania recognizing a common-law right of 
public performance, see Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station 
(Pa. 1937) 194 A. 631, and three states (North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Florida) enacting statutes prohibiting recognition 
of such a right.  See Ringer, Copyright Law Revision Study No. 
26, The Unauthorized Duplication of Sound Recordings (1957), at 
pages 8-9 and n.79.16  In 1940, the Second Circuit decided RCA 
                                                                                                       
Rather, he derived what the law should be from first principles of 
natural law, and then criticized the cases that departed from it.”  
Id. at page 1411.  The fact that some courts later accepted 
Drone’s view, and that Keene v. Kimball was overruled by the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court in 1882, could not have been 
known to the California Legislature when it adopted the Civil 
Code in 1872. 
16 Two of those statutes are still in effect.  See N.C. Gen. Stat. 
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Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman (2d Cir. 1940) 114 F.2d 86, cert. 
denied (1940) 311 U.S. 712 (hereafter Whiteman), which 
questioned the existence of a common-law right of public 
performance, and held that even assuming such a right existed, 
any such right was divested when the sound recordings were first 
sold to the public, notwithstanding the restrictive legend on some 
of the records “Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast.”  Id. at page 
88.17 
Although Whiteman was technically decided as a matter of 
New York law, “when the Supreme Court refused to hear the case 
on December 16, 1940, it became official:  Judge Hand’s opinion 
was [accepted as] the last word on the legality of broadcasting 
sound recordings.”  Parks, supra, at page 121.  See also Bard and 
Kurlantzick, A Public Performance Right in Recordings:  How to 
Alter the Copyright System Without Improving It (1974) 43 Geo. 
Wash. L.Rev. 152, 155 (“The last reported case involving 
                                                                                                       
Ann. § 66-28; S.C. Code Ann. § 39-3-510.  Although Florida 
repealed its statute effective July 1, 1977, the Florida Supreme 
Court recently refused to recognize a public performance right in 
sound recordings under Florida common law.  Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. 
Sirius XM Radio, Inc. (Fla. 2017) 124 U.S.P.Q.2d 1471. 
17 “[T]he monopoly of the right to reproduce the compositions of 
any author—his ‘common-law property’ in them—was not limited 
to words; . . . and for the purposes of this case we shall assume 
that it covers the performances of an orchestra conductor. . . .  [If 
so, w]e think that the ‘common-law property’ in these 
performances ended with the sale of the records and that the 
restriction did not save it; and that if it did, the records 
themselves could not be clogged with a servitude.”  Id. at page 88. 
21 
purported common law performing rights was R.C.A. Mfg Co. v. 
Whiteman.”).  Instead, “performers refocused their efforts from 
the courts to Congress.  No fewer than six bills were introduced 
between 1942 and 1951; they were designed to bring recordings 
under the copyright statute.”  Parks, supra, at page 123.  All such 
efforts failed.  Indeed, by the 1950s, the economics of the music 
industry were such that record companies paid broadcasters to 
play their recordings, rather than vice versa, in order to promote 
the sales of records.  Id. at page 137; Bard & Kurlantzick, supra, 
at page 155. 
In 1947, California amended Civil Code section 980 to read 
as follows: 
The author or proprietor of any composition in letters 
or art has an exclusive ownership in the 
representation or expression thereof as against all 
persons except one who originally and independently 
creates a same or similar composition.18 
                                      
18 The restriction in section 980 “as against all persons except one 
who originally and independently creates a same or similar 
composition” was not new.  Independent creation has always 
been a defense to both federal and statutory copyright, as was 
recognized in the 1872 version of Civil Code section 984.  The 
substance of former Civil Code section 984 was merely 
transferred to and combined with section 980.  See Legis. 
Counsel, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 566 (1947 Reg. Sess.), page 2 
(“Section 984 is repealed but present provisions of this section 
that ownership of a product of the mind shall be protected 
against everyone except one originally producing the same are 
retained, as to compositions in letters and art.”).  The other 
change was changing “any product of the mind” to “any 
composition in letters or art,” thereby “excluding such other 
intellectual products as inventions from protection under this 
 
22 
At the same time, it amended Civil Code section 983 to 
read: 
If the owner of a composition in letters or art 
publishes it, the same may be used in any manner by 
any person, without responsibility to the owner 
insofar as the law of this State is concerned. 
The change to section 983, from “intentionally makes it 
public” to “publishes it,” was intended to make it clear that only 
“publication”—the reproduction and sale of copies of a work—
would divest common-law copyright, and that mere public 
performance or display, by itself, would not divest common-law 
copyright.19  This is perfectly consistent with Whiteman, which 
had held that the sale of phonograph records divested any 
common-law performance rights which might be thought to exist 
in those sound recordings. 
The New York Court of Appeals recently reaffirmed that 
“New York’s common-law copyright has never recognized a right 
of public performance for pre-1972 sound recordings.”  Flo & 
Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc. (2016) 28 N.Y.3d 583, 605 
(emphasis added); see also id. at page 589.  In so holding, it cited 
and approved both Palmer v. De Witt and Whiteman, see id. at 
                                                                                                       
chapter.”  Id. at page 1.  The 1949 amendment reinstated trade 
secret protection for inventions and designs, while redesignating 
existing section 980 as section 980(a). 
19 See Legis. Counsel, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 566, supra, at page 
2 (“Exhibition or performance under conditions which imply no 
right to make copies are not held to be publication under these 
[case law] precedents, although they may constitute a making 
public under present law.”). 
23 
pages 595-97,20 and it expressly distinguished later New York 
cases as involving only the common-law right of reproduction and 
distribution of copies.  Id. at pages 597-602.  Because California’s 
Civil Code was originally based on New York common law, this 
Court should infer that the California Legislature in 1947 wanted 
to codify existing case law on the issue, which was Whiteman. 
In 1971, as a condition of getting federal copyright 
protection against unauthorized duplication and sale of 
recordings made on or after February 15, 1972, record companies 
grudgingly accepted the fact that such federal protection would 
likewise not include any public performance right.  See Sound 
Recording Amendments Act of 1971, Pub.L. No. 92-140 (Oct. 15, 
1971), § 1, 85 Stat. 391.  Congress expressly had considered 
enacting a public performance right for sound recordings; a 
previous version of the bill “encompass[ed] a performance right so 
that record companies and performing artists would be 
compensated when their records were performed for commercial 
purposes,” but the public performance right was deliberately 
removed from the final legislation.  H.R. Rep. 92-487 at page 3 
(1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1568.  This 
restriction was later codified in Section 114(a) of the 1976 
Copyright Act:  “The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in 
                                      
20 Recall that Palmer v. De Witt was decided in 1872, the same 
year that the California Legislature first enacted the disputed 
language in Civil Code section 980; and Whiteman was decided in 
1940, only seven years before the 1947 amendment to Civil Code 
section 980. 
24 
a sound recording . . . do not include any right of performance 
under section 106(4).”  17 U.S.C. § 114(a).  Had record companies 
believed at the time that they had a right of public performance 
under California law, it is highly doubtful that they would have 
accepted a federal law that divested them of any such rights for 
sound recordings made on or after February 15, 1972. 
It is against this historical backdrop that section 980 was 
amended most recently, in 1982.  The purpose of the amendment 
was to limit the subject matter of that section to those works that 
were not preempted by the 1976 Copyright Act; namely, 
improvised works not yet fixed in a tangible medium of 
expression (§ 980(a)(1)), and sound recordings made before 
February 15, 1972 (§ 980(a)(2)).  The provisions of former section 
983 relating to copyrightable works were repealed, because it was 
no longer necessary to specify that state-law protection would 
terminate upon first publication.  For unfixed works, state-law 
would terminate as soon as they were fixed in a tangible medium 
(17 U.S.C. § 301(a)); and for pre-1972 sound recordings, Congress 
chose to allow states to protect them against unauthorized 
reproduction and sale even after “publication” had occurred (17 
U.S.C. § 301(c)).  There is no indication anywhere in the 
legislative history that the California Legislature intended to 
change the meaning of “exclusive ownership,” which had never 
included a public performance right, or that it intended to create 
a public performance right for sound recordings where none had 
existed before. 
25 
If, as Plaintiff contends, the phrase “exclusive ownership” 
in section 980 was meant to include a public performance right in 
sound recordings in California, why did recording companies 
publicly complain for decades, both before and after the 1982 
amendments, that they did not have a public performance right 
in their recordings? 21  Their silence in asserting such a right, and 
their vehement public protests about the unfairness of not having 
such a right, ought to be conclusive on the question of whether 
such a right exists (or ever existed) under Civil Code section 980. 
III. APPLYING A PUBLIC PERFORMANCE RIGHT 
UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW TO NATIONAL 
BROADCASTERS WOULD IMPROPERLY EXTEND 
CALIFORNIA LAW TO PERFORMANCES 
OCCURRING WHOLLY OUTSIDE THE BORDERS 
OF THE STATE. 
Pandora uses the Internet to carry its broadcasts to 
listeners.  While Pandora may be able to use geolocation tools to 
estimate where many of its listeners are located, such tools are 
imperfect and easily circumvented.  More importantly, if this 
Court were to interpret Civil Code section 980 to grant a public 
performance right to owners of sound recordings, for the first 
                                      
21 The history of recording industry testimony in Congress about 
the lack of an existing public performance right for sound 
recordings is well-documented in Pandora’s brief.  That the 
recording companies were referring to pre-1972 sound recordings 
as well as more recent ones is demonstrated by the example that 
the RIAA chose to illustrate the issue:  Bing Crosby’s classic 1942 
recording of “White Christmas.”  Report of the Register of 
Copyrights, Copyright Implications of Digital Audio 
Transmission Services (Oct. 1991), App’x at page 17. 
26 
time, its ruling would not be confined to Pandora and other 
Internet broadcasters.  It would necessarily also apply to every 
radio and television network and broadcast station whose signal 
reaches listeners located in California.  But broadcast signals 
cannot be confined to the borders of a particular state, and 
broadcasters are unable to tailor their signal so that it reaches 
only listeners who live outside of California.  In order to comply 
with California law, broadcasters would be required to refrain 
from performing pre-1972 sound recordings, which would 
interfere with their First Amendment rights to communicate 
with listeners who live outside of California.  As the Ninth 
Circuit recently recognized in Sam Francis Foundation v. 
Christie’s, Inc. (9th Cir. 2015) 784 F.3d 1320 (en banc), 
application of California law to transactions located wholly 
outside of California violates the dormant commerce clause.  See 
also Whiteman, 114 F.2d at pages 89-90 (refusing to issue an 
injunction based on Pennsylvania law, because broadcast signals 
could not be confined to Pennsylvania); Bard & Kurlantzick, 
supra, at page 157 (“since radio and television broadcasters are 
the predominant public performers of recorded music[,] the 
disruption of interstate commerce attributable to state 
recognition of a record public performance right would be 
considerably more severe than that to be expected from state 
anti-piracy legislation.”). 
As the district court in a similar case in New York 
acknowledged, “the conspicuous lack of any jurisprudential 
history confirms that not paying royalties for public performances 
27 
of sound recordings was an accepted fact of life in the 
broadcasting industry for the last century.”  Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. 
Sirius XM Radio, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 62 F.Supp.3d 325, 340.  
Imposing an obligation to pay such royalties now, retroactively, 
on a state-by-state basis, would be incredibly disruptive to the 
broadcast industry, and would improperly extend California law 
outside of the borders of California.  If such a drastic change in 
the status quo is to occur, it should be done prospectively, on a 
nationwide basis, by Congress, as the Register of Copyrights has 
recommended.  Report of the Register of Copyrights, Federal 
Copyright Protection for Pre-1972 Sound Recordings (Dec. 2011).  
Plaintiff’s frustration with Congressional inaction is not a 
sufficient reason to recognize public performance rights under 
California law retroactively, 145 years after the disputed 
language in Civil Code section 980 was first enacted, and eight 
decades after broadcasting was invented. 
CONCLUSION 
For 75 years, performers and record companies alike 
accepted Whiteman as the law and testified in Congress that they 
lacked a public performance right in sound recordings.  With one 
limited exception, Congress has resisted all invitations to enact a 
public performance right in sound recordings.  It is only 
dissatisfaction with Congress’s judgment that has led sound 
recording copyright owners to try to get this Court to recognize a 
public performance right under state law.  When viewed in 
historical context, however, it is clear that Civil Code section 
980(a)(2) refers only to the common-law right to reproduce and 
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APPENDIX:  LIST OF AMICI CURIAE 
 
Howard B. Abrams 
Professor of Law 
University of Detroit Mercy School of Law 
 
Michael A. Carrier 
Distinguished Professor of Law 
Rutgers School of Law 
 
Michael W. Carroll 
Professor of Law and Director 
Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property 
American University Washington College of Law 
 
Ralph D. Clifford 
Professor of Law 
University of Massachusetts School of Law 
 
Brian L. Frye 
Associate Professor of Law 
University of Kentucky College of Law 
 
William Gallagher 
Professor of Law and Director 
IP Law Center 
Golden Gate University School of Law 
 
Eric Goldman 
Professor of Law and Co-Director 
High Tech Law Institute 
Santa Clara University School of Law 
 
James Grimmelmann 
Professor of Law 
Cornell Tech and Cornell Law School 
 
Yvette Joy Liebesman 
Professor of Law 
Saint Louis University School of Law 
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Brian J. Love 
Associate Professor of Law and Co-Director 
High Tech Law Institute 
Santa Clara University School of Law 
 
Tyler T. Ochoa 
Professor of Law 
High Tech Law Institute 
Santa Clara University School of Law 
 
David G. Post 
Professor of Law (ret.) 
Temple University Beasley School of Law 
 
Michael Risch 
Professor of Law 
Villanova University School of Law 
 
Matthew Sag 
Professor of Law 
Loyola University of Chicago School of Law 
 
Rebecca Tushnet 
Professor of Law 
Harvard Law School 
 
David S. Welkowitz 
Professor of Law 
Whittier Law School 
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PROOF OF SERVICE 
I am a citizen of the United States and resident of the State 
of California.  I am employed in San Francisco County, State of 
California, in the office of a member of the bar of this Court, at 
whose direction the service was made.  I am over the age of 
eighteen years, and not a party to the within action.  My business 
address is 217 Leidesdorff Street, San Francisco, CA  94111.   
On January 12, 2018, I served the following documents in 
the manner described below: 
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE COPYRIGHT AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW PROFESSORS 
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT-PETITIONER 
PANDORA MEDIA, INC.  
 (BY OVERNIGHT MAIL)  I am personally and 
readily familiar with the business practice of Durie 
Tangri LLP for collection and processing of 
correspondence for overnight delivery, and I caused 
such document(s) described herein to be deposited for 
delivery to a facility regularly maintained by Federal 
Express for overnight delivery. 
 
On the following part(ies) in this action: 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent 
Flo & Eddie, Inc.: 
 
Henry D. Gradstein 
Maryann R. Marzano 
Gradstein & Marzano, P.C. 
6310 San Vicente Boulevard, Suite 510 
Los Angeles, CA 90048 
 
Kalpana Srinivasan 
Steven Gerald Sklaver 
Susman Godfrey L.L.P. 
1900 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1400 
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